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RATIONALE FOR DETERMINING NEWSBOY AND LIFE
INSURANCE SOLICITOR STATUS UNDER UNEMIPLOYMENT AND WORKMAEN'S COTMPENSATION STATUTESf
REYNOLDS C. SEITZ*

The fact that the various states have not adopted a uniform
position' with respect to the status of the newsboy and life insurance solicitor under unemployment and workmen's compensation statutes is justification for an article which seeks to analyze principles which should control decisions in newsboy and
insurance solicitor cases arising under such statutes. Particularly would this seem to be true in the light of the impetus which
may be given to litigation as a result of Supreme Court utterances in National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Putblications,
Inc. 2

In the Hearst case, the Supreme Court held that news-

boys who sold at established spots on the streets of the city and

' The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and
should not be attributed to his employer.
* A.B., 1929, Notre Dame University; A.M., 1932, Northwestern
University; LL.B., 1935, The Creighton University; Professor of Law,
The Creighton University, 1938-41, Senior Attorney, Review Division,
National Labor Relations Board, 1941-42; Professor of Business Law,
The Municipal University of Omaha, 1942-43; Attorney, Montgomery
Ward and Company, Chicago, 1943; Executive, The Chicago Daily
News; frequent contributor to legal periodicals; admitted to practice
in Nebraska in 1935.
'See, for example, the following cases which hold newsboys not
subject to social legislation acts: Bernat v. Star-Chronicle Pub. Co.,
84 S. W. (2d) 429 (Mo., 1935), involving workmen's compensation;
Cresswell v. Charlotte News Pub. Co., 204 N. C. 380, 168 S. E. 408
(1933), involving workmen's compensation; Balinski v. Press Pub.
Co., 118 Pa. 89, 179 Atl. 897 (1935), involving workmen's compensation; Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P.
(2d) 718 (1939), involving unemployment insurance. Compare the
following decisions which extend coverage to newsboys: State Compensation Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm., 216 Cal. 351, 14 P.
(2d) 306 (1932), involving workmen's compensation; New York
Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 213 Cal. 43, 1 P. (2d) 12
(1931), involving workmen's compensation; Salt Lake Tribune Pub.
Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99 Utah 259, 102 P. (2d) 307 (1940), involving unemployment insurance. For the conflict involving life
insurance solicitors see the compilation of cases cited in the article
by the present author, Independent Calling of Life Insurance Solicitor
Under State Unemployment Compensation Acts (1941) 29 Ky. L.
J. 181.
'88 L. Ed. Sup. Ct. Rep. (Advance Opinions) 824 (April 25,
1944).
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suburbs of Los Angeles were entitled under the National Labor
Relations Act to bargain collectively with the publishers of the
newspapers which they sold. The Court, speaking through Mr.
-Justice Rutledge, expressed the opinion that in formulating the
National Labor Relations Act, Congress had in mind a wider
field than the narrow technical legal relation of the master and
servant, and that such intent is controlling because "interruption of commerce through strikes and unrest may stem as well
from labor disputes between those who, for other purposes, are
technically independent contractors." Such language, although
not applicable to the unemployment insurance and workmen's
compensation fields, will, nevertheless, probably furnish the incentive which will cause new efforts to be made to establish that
the intent of social legislation of the compensation and insurance
type is broad enough to afford coverage to such individuals as
newsboys and insurance solicitors. Additional impetus will also
be found in some of the other expressions which appear in the
Hcarst case. These other expressions will be alluded to in the
course of the present treatise.
Before proceeding with the discussion, it is necessary to
make clear the limits of analysis. Of course, much of what will
be said will be generally applicable in determining employeremployee relationships. Nevertheless, since changes in facts
are vitally important in working out relationships in the employment area, it is imperative to narrow analysis so that it
will cover individuals who fall within the following categories
and who function as described:
1. Newsboys who sell competing newspapers full time at
established "spots" or "corners" on the streets of the
city or suburbs. 3 The newsboys can be, and usually
are, mature men or women. The newspaper managements have no authority to shift the newsboys from one
spot to another. 4 The newsboys' compensation consists of the difference in prices at which they sell the
papers and the prices they pay for them.
'Usually they secure the "spots" by virtue of squatter's rights.

Sometimes they "buy" the "spot" from one who has acquired title
by possession. In Chicago they secure permits under city ordinance.
See Municipal Code (1939) secs. 34-8 to 34-13.
A fact which is not similar to any in the Hearst case, where the
newspaper district manager assigned "spots" or corners and had
authority to transfer from one "spot" to another.
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2. Newspaper carriers who deliver papers part time on
home routes in city and suburbs. The carrier operates
under what is known in the trade as "The Little TMerchant" plan. The carrier purchases papers from the
publisher and delivers them to his subscribers within a
designated territory. He pays the publisher a stipulated price for the papers regardless of whether or
not he collects from the subscriber. The carrier uses
his own method and means of obtaining customers,
making delivery, and collecting. The carrier's profit
is the difference between the amount he pays the publisher and the amount collected from the subscribers.
No fines are levied although if the newspaper must
assume the duty of making deliveries itself the cost
can be charged against the carrier.
It is further necessary to limit discussion so that it will
concern itself with specified statutory coverage of the following
nature:
1. Unemployment Insurance Acts as found in the vast
majority of statesr in which the word employment is
defined as:
"Services performed by an individual for remuneration shall be deemed employment subject to
this act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the director that:
"(A)
Such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over
the performance of such service, both under
his contract of service and in fact, and
"(B)

Such service is either outside the usual

The following states define "employment" in a different manner: Conn., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Ky., Minn., Miss., N. Y., Ore., and Tex.
As regards the insurance solicitor, certain states specifically exempt
the commission paid insurance salesmen by the wording of their
statutes. Ala., Colo., Ind., Ky., La., Mass., Mich., Neb., Ohio, S. D.,
and Va. are in the group. But even though such differences and
exemptions exist, the insurance companies organized in such states
are interested in the situation in other jurisdictions where they may
be licensed to do business. They may also be vitally interested
because of the retaliatory tax law. See on the latter point the
author's article, Retaliatory Insurance Tax Laws (1939)
B. 150.

18
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course of the business for which such service
is performed, or that such service is performed
outside of all the places of business of the enterprises for which such service is performed;
and
Such individual is customarily en"(C)
gaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession or business, of the same
nature as that involved in the contract of
service."
2. Workmen's Compensation Acts which employ the
and
"employee"
three cognate terms, "employer,"
"employment" with little further definition.
IT IS APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT TO REEMIPIIASIZE THAT WHENEVER THE TERM NEWSBOY,
COIPENSASOLICITOR,
WORKMEN'S
INITRANCE
INSURANCE
TI ( )N STATUTE, OR UNEMPLOYMENT
STATUTE IS USED EACH TERM HAS THE DEFINITION
JITST PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH.
With definition completed, it is now possible to return to
the theme of the article. The reader who is familiar with the
problems involved realizes that the major portion of reasoning
will revolve around employee versus independent contractor
,-oncepts. And at the very core of discussion analysis will take
the form of scrutiny of the significance of the "power of control" test as a determining factor in deciding the question as to
whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor in the light of intent under workmen's compensation and
unemployment insurance statutes.
It is not possible to make such an approach without taking
theory
,-0nizance of the adverse criticism of the "control"
which has, in the minds of many, succeeded in making of such
theory nothing more than antiquated and discredited dogma.
Iideed, as far back as 1935, Professor Steffen was forced into
justifying his discussion of the characteristics of the independent contractor by his realization that "of late there has been
a growing tendency somewhat emotional in character, to look
upon the independent contractor with disfavor, as little more
L

J.-3
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than a sham, a mere lawyer's device, conceived in sin and
brought forth to provide undeserved immunity. "6
The real difficulty in considering the status of an individual as employee or independent contractor arises out of the fact
that there is reason and logic behind so much of what has been
said relative to the artificiality of the "control" test as it has
been spelled out by the courts in determining employment relationships. The accuracy of Professor Steffen's remark that
"the theoretical basis for vicarious responsibility is based upon
a curious complex of truths, half truths, and mystic intuitions"7
cannot be gainsaid. The truth of Stevens'8 quotation from
Baty's work on Vicarious Liability9 to the effect that vicarious
liability has "attained its luxuriant growth through carelessness and false analogy" cannot be denied.
The situation is actually such that no writer can attempt
the role of Solomon of which Professor Buscheck spoke when
he stated that "a veritable judicial Solomon could not formulate
any general principle or principles which would reconcile all
statements (about salesmen) because so often based on the vague
and nebulous conceptions of what constitutes a servant, an
agent, and an independent contractor.'10 The most that will be
attempted in this article will be to review the important thinking on the question of the "control test" as it can be applied to
the determination of the status of newsboys and insurance solicitors under unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation statutes. (The types of newsboys, solicitors, and statutes
have been described previously.) This will be done with the intent of determining the adequacy of the expressed philosophy,
and with the more fundamental purpose of setting forth a logical rationale upon which to explain the position of newsboys
and insurance solicitors under the indicated two forms of social
legislation.
In actual point of fact, the present investigation will concern itself, for the most part, with the reasoning of those thinkers and courts which have discerned in unemployment insurance
The Independent Contractor and the Good Life (1935) 2 U. of
CHI. L. R. 501.
7Supra, note 6.
' The Test of the Employment Relation (1940) 38 MICH. L. R. 188.
1916.
" Life Insurance Solicitor or Independent Contractor (1917) 25
GEo. L. J. 894.
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and workmen's compensation acts an intent to afford coverage
to newsboys and insurance solicitors. This emphasis may appear unjustifiable in the light of a situation which finds the
vast majority of courts holding that newsboys and insurance
solicitors are not afforded coverage under the statutes described
previously. There is, however, a very definite purpose for the
emphasis of this article. The proponents of extended coverage
have devoted the most time and energy to working out argument to sustain their position. The advocates of restricted coverage, have, on the other hand, been content to rest conclusion
upon a mere recital of lack of control as proved by the summary
of the facts in each case. There has been little attempt to explain why lack of control should have the effect of restricting
coverage under social legislation. Indeed, the actual situation
suggests that even though the courts are presently showing a
tendency to restrict coverage-as Wolfe, one of the pleaders for
extended coverage, admits in the Columbia Law Review tm-the
detailed reasoning of those who would extend coverage could
prove to be so appealing to some jurisdictions as to actually induce a shift in present thinking.
In the attempt to establish newsboy and insurance solicitor
coJverage under the two types of social legislation previously
named, the focal point of attack is on the ground of intent.
Wolfe' 2 focuses attention upon intent under workmen's compensation statutes by remarking that such statutes were designed to permit recovery regardless of fault and that it is
strange that the independent contractor concept was imported
from the tort field where it was used as a defense against neg-

ligenve. A similar argument could be employed in an effort to
show intent under unemployment insurance acts.

Reasoning of such nature serves the purpose of "spotlighting" the importance of discussing the limitations on the responsibility of the one who benefits from service performed of
"Determination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social
Legislation (1941) 41 COL. L. R. 1015. Wolfe laments that jurisdictions have held that the old employer-employee concepts are implied
by the acts, and that they have thereby greatly constricted the scope
of relationships the acts intended to cover. He regretfully admits
that, "at the present time the restrictive tendency is on the increase"
-citing as the latest instance, Hill Hotel Co. v. Kinney, 138 Neb.
760, 295 N. W. 397 (1940).
" Supra, note 11.
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providing for the economic protection of the one who performs
13
the service.
It will not be easy to work out the limits of such responsibility. The difficulty is increased by the existence of "spread
the risk" and "economic dependency" theories. The chief and
classical exposition of the economics of social legislation" 4 involves the theory that the financial cost of accidents or unemployment ought to be treated as a part of the expense of production, made an element of the price of goods, and so passed
on to the ultimate consumer. The corollary philosophy is that,
because of the "economic dependency" of the worker, the one
who benefits from services should bear the cost of social legislation since it is he who will have "the deepest pocket." This
attitude is not often expressed openly by the courts, but it is
recognized as an underlying principle which surely guides decision. It was indeed one of the elements which helped shape
the result in the recent case of National Labor Relatims Board
v. Hearst Pitblicatioiis Izc.", The court in the Hearst case
took pains to point out that newsboys may be as dependent on
the daily wage and as unable to leave the employer and to resist
arbitrary and unfair treatment as an admitted employee. 1'
It cannot be denied that all such assumptions and theories
have a fundamental appeal. It has never been contended, however, that legislative intent erased all lines between risks which
will be carried and those considered too uneconomical to impose.' 7 No court or writer has gone all the way in applying the
"deepest pocket" reasoning. In the light of such facts and in
spite of the derisive quality of much of the criticism of the
"control test," it is submitted that the courts have not been
wrong in allowing it to remain as a device to ascertain whether
a particular individual is subject to the terms of social legis"It must be conceded that even the one who admittedly deals
with an independent contractor benefits from the service rendered.
" First mentioned in connection with establishing a rationale
to support workmen's compensation.
' Supra, note 2.
"While the decision in the Hearst case, supra, note 2, did not
directly concern itself with the "deepest pocket" because there was
no possibility of requiring a direct outlay of money, it very clearly
exhibits adhqrence to "economic dependency" thinking. Usually

adherence to such theory indicates a direct relationship with the
"deepest pocket" expressions.
'See, Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation (1940) 38
MIcH. L. R. 188.
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lation statutes.

Such test can be of value in working out
under workmen's compensation and
unemployment insurance acts. In the absence of clear intent to
impose upon the one who enters into a contract for service an
absolute responsibility for the economic welfare of all who furnish such service, it appears equitable to use the "control test"
to mark the limits of responsibility. Justification for applying
such tcs., can be found to exist in reasoning which would establish a legislative intent to impose added economic responsibility
in rxchange for what ought to be the additional economic beneils accruing from the "power to control." It is true that the
independent contractor concept has been imported from the tort
lield and that workmen's compensation instituted liability without fault. These facts, however, do not furnish indication that
ioverage was to be extended beyond the limits of employeesor those over whom the employer had the "power of control."
This fact may have been obliterated by over-emphasis on the
fiction which employs the "power of control" test in imposing
tort liability on ani employer for injuries caused third persons by
his servants. When used for such purpose the test is pure
fit-tion and is easily subject to attack. It would appear that the
test has greater validity when used to determine responsibility
for ,afeguarding economic welfare under social legislation
,statutes. On the ai-erage, it would appear that "power to
control" confers an economic benefit which supports a duty to
bear the cost of insuring a degree of economic stability for those
who art emnployees.
I (,onomit responsibility

Support for such reasoning is not impaired by the arguments of the advocates of extended coverage. In this article,
I,,terinination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social
Legislation, Wolfe has remarked:' "The device of changing
the legal status of the master-servant relation by artificially subtra,.ting from it the right of control, ordinarily in cases where
surh control could never be practically exercised, was not
contemplated in the history and development of independent
I.ontra.torship. ''''
It might more realistically be said that the
purpose of imposing responsibility for the economic security
" Supra, note 11.
See also dissent in Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Comm., 99
Utah 423, 107 P. (2d) 1027 (1940).
"
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of those over whom control cannot be practically exercised is
something which was not contemplated by legislatures when
they drew up social legislation. Unless the philosophy of absolute responsibility for economic welfare based upon the "deepest pocket" theory is to control conclusions, it will be practical
for the courts to make a distinction in fact between situations
where control cannot he practically exercised and those where
there has been an attempt to artificially provide freedom from
control when in reality control existed.
Analysis of concrete facts should help to establish the
validity of the "control test" as a device for determining
coverage under social legislation. In the case of newsboys and
life insurance solicitors, the facts clearly establish no real
power of control. There is, of course, power over results of the
work, but, as the courts have so often remarked in finding
newsboys and insurance solicitors to be independent contractors,
there is no control over the means and manner of performance.""
Of course, it may be said that in the ultimate sense power over
the results of the work, with the right to terminate the contract
with one who does not produce results, gives control. The courts
have often decided that this type of ultimate control is not to
be decisive on the question as to whether an individual is an
independent contractor. In fact, to permit such test to be
controlling would wipe out the concept of independent contractor, which, as this article has previously demonstrated,
the law makers, in passing social legislation, had no intent
to do.
In spite of the existence of a final right to terminate a
business arrangement or contract, it is possible to establish the
economic significance of the "power of control" over the means
and manner of performance. The practical business man will
be quick to testify to the value in improvement of efficiency and
production which can result from control over the means and
manner of performance of employees. Unless it is not economical
for him to bear the cost (because of lack of equipment, lack of
knowledge for the task to be performed or practical impossibility
of supervision), the employer prefers to exercise control over
-Balinski v. Press Pub. Co., 118 Pa. 89, 179 Atl. 897 (1935);
Bernat v. Star-Chronicle Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 429 (Mo. 1935) cite what
has become the general rule.
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the means and manner of performance in order to insure the
maximum in return which will grow out of intelligent supervision.
The "power of control" does truly place something of
eonomie value into the hands of an employer which can logically
justify the imposition of economic responsibility under social
legislation. It would unquestionably be valuable to the insurance company if they had some means of supervision of agents
which would make each solicitor's success less dependent upon
individual selling efforts. The mere power to control the time
the agent spends at his work should produce economic benefit.
Even more significant would be the value accruing if the
company could control selling technique. Much the same is true
in the case of newspaper carriers. It would benefit the newspaper publishers to know that the carriers are giving their
personal attention to subscribers, putting forth maximum efforts
to secure new customers, and in general using intelligent effort
and performance in order to build good-will. In the case of
newsboys who operate stands at definite spots, it would be of
distinct value to a newspaper to have the "power of control"
which would give the right to have the vendor give exclusive
service.
But, even if there is acceptance that there is logic in
employing the "power of control" test in working out the
limits of responsibility under workmen's compensation and
unemployment insurance statutes, such fact does not overcome
the proposition that courts must be vigilant in making sure that
employers do not convert servants into false independent contractors by the legerdemain of artificially abstracting the
"power of control." 2 1 In an effort to induce such vigilance it
has been suggested that courts need to consider as very important in determining employee versus independent contractor
status the matter of "independent calling" of the, one relied
upon for the performance of service.2 2 The legislatures have
themselves made such suggestion in Clause C of the unemployment insurance acts in the provision that it is necessary to establish that an individual is engaged in an "independently estab11See Wolfe, Determinationof Employer-Employee Relationships
in Social Legislation, supra, note 11, for the implied suggestion.
'I"
Supra, note 11.
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lished trade, occupation, profession or business" before he can
be classed as an independent contractor who is not subject to
23
the statutes.
In order that there can be understanding and appreciation
of the real merit of the "independent calling" test for independent contractor, it is necessary to have a clear knowledge of
the meaning of the term. To gain such insight, it is imperative
to have an awareness of some of the mistaken attitudes which
have developed. Certain of the literature written about
employer-employee relationships2 4 has so closely associated the
concept of "special job or piece of work" with that of "independent calling" that it is necessary to point out that even
the proponents of extended coverage admit that the devotion
of all services over a period exclusively to one employer will
not necessarily be in subversion of an "independent calling.'"25
The element of "special job" is merely one factor which may,
under some circumstances, be of evidentiary value in establishing
"independent calling" and supporting a finding that a certain
individual is an independent contractor. The true test of
"independent calling" seems to be most adequately set forth
in the Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst decision. 2"
It is there stated: "The question whether or not one is pursuing
an independent occupation ...

depends upon ... whether in the

pursuit of his occupation he is acting upon his own behalf or
as the servant of another.'27 The Washington court, in making
such statement, clearly reveals that the question of "independent
calling" cannot be decided without making use of the "power
of control" test.
It is, of course, such very attitude which draws the criticism
of the proponents of extended coverage under social legislation.
It should not, of course, be forgotten that the courts have
-declared that a prerequisite to exemption from coverage under the
unemployment compensation laws consists in showing a conformity
with all of the "unless" clauses previously quoted herein. To show

that an individual is exempt under one or two of the clauses is of no
avail. See Industrial Comm. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Co., 103
Colo. 550, 88 P. (2d) 560 (1939); Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 36, 91 P. (2d) 512 (1939); Washington
Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
"Supra, notes 8 and 11.
Supra, note 11.
- 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
The Court specifically makes the reasoning apply to section C

of the unemployment insurance acts.
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What, they ask, could be the purpose of mentioning the "right
of control" test of the employment relation in one section of
the unemployment insurance statute, and the "independent
calling" test in another section of the same act, if the question
of "independent calling" was to be decided with reference to
the matter of "power of control"? The question, seemingly
so, plausible, has an answer. It can realistically be contended
that the "independent calling" test was inserted to forcefully
express legislative intent that there should be no avoidance of
responsibility by artificially abstracting the right of control.
It is true that the legislature had already used in connection
with the "freedom of control" clause the phrase "both under
his contract of service and in fact." Careful draughtsmanship
does not, however, shy away from any technique which will
improve clarity. By writing into the statute the "independent
calling" Clause C, the legislature specifically defined the
neaningo of the "in fact" proviso of Clause A.
That the test laid down by the Wasluigtoii Recorder
Pitblihing ('o.2s case is workable in its application to newsboys
and insurance solicitors can now be demonstrated. A review of
the employment contract facts and the comments made previously
herein reveal on their face that there is no control over the
neans and manner of performance. In order, however, to prove
that there is no control "in fact," it becomes pertinent to
determine whether control was artificially removed or whether
the newsboys and insurance solicitors are actually "acting on"
their own behalf and, therefore, engaged in an "independent
calling."
In examining any agreement for artificiality it is always
important to seek for clauses which reveal real intent. The
clause which leaves the newspaper carriers29' free to use their
own methods of making delivery-even to the extent of making
arrangements for a substitute to function-negates any idea
of attempt to keep control. The conclusion is further bolstered
by the clear intention on the part of the carrier to assume the
2'Supra,note 26.
-- Many newsboy carriers are 17 years of age or under. Under
present unemployment insurance provisions, they are not afforded
coverage. In case age limits might be changed, it is pertinent to discuss their position.
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profit risk of his "own business" or "independent calling.' '
Such intention is manifest in the arrangement by which the
carrier pays the publisher a stipulated price for the papers
regardless of whether or not he succeeds in making his collections
from the subscribers. That there was no concealed idea of
making such clause sterile is evidenced by the further provision
that the carriers are to use their own methods and means of
obtaining customers and doing the collecting. The very fact
that carriers work only part time, and spend the major portion
of their time at school work or other endeavor furnishes additional evidence that the carriers desire to be free from control so
that they can make the most expedient use of their time. The
relatively small scale business operations of carriers do not in
any sense destroy such evidence. There is nothing to prevent a
small scale enterprise from being a carrier's "own business."
In the instance of newsboys who sell papers at definite spots,
it is not difficult to demonstrate an honest intent that there
should be no publisher control. Such newsboys exercise their
own initiative in securing "spots" and the publishers have no
authority whatever to shift them from one spot to another. The
very fact that the newsboys "buy" and "sell" the paper of
competing newspapers is very important in disproving any
artificial arrangement to disprove actual control. The lack of
power on the part of any one newspaper to demand exclusive
service logically points toward a valid intent to have the newsboys recognized as engaged in an "independent calling." Here
again it can be repeated that the size of the business should have
no bearing upon whether or not its operator is a proprietor or
a servant. To argue to the contrary would imply that the "shoestring" operator of a small hamburger stand might become an
employee of the packing firm from whom he buys meat. There
is no indication that the law makers had any intention of
allowing sympathy for small operators to remove them from
the "independent calling" class.
It is interesting to note that one of the tests which the RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Sec. 220, sets forth for determining independent contractor status is that of "whether the parties believe they are creating

the relationship of master and servant." In explanation of this test
the authors of the Restatement say, "It is not important that the
parties believe or disbelieve that the relationship of master and
servant exists, except as such belief indicates an assumption of control by the one and submission to control by the other."

STATTUS OF

\EsVSBOYS AND INSURANCE AGENTS

It remains now to analyze the status of the life insurance
solicitor. The present writer has already performed this function
in some detail in an article entitled, Independent Calling of
Life Insmranzce Solicitor Under State UMeiploynent Compezsation Acts. 3 1 There will be no attempt here at repetition.
Brief indication will illustrate that efforts at relinquishing control do not express an artificial situation. In spite of the
attempts of home office supervisors and general agent field men
to stimulate industry in selling efforts, the insurance solicitor
remains free of control. He may work today and not tomorrow;
he may show effort today and not tomorrow. There is no
realistic, fundamental control which can be imposed upon him.
As a matter of fact, it is just because the insurance agent has
the sole inherent power-at all times, prosperous and depressed
-of making his livelihood that he can be said to be engaged in
an "independent calling." The insurance solicitor, unlike many
types of salesmen, has no route and no set number of calls he has
to make during the day and report upon at the end of the day.
()n the contrary, he has the responsibility of uncovering his own
prospects. Furthermore, the insurance solicitor works solely on
(,ommission. In a very realistic sense the whole plan of operation
illustrates that in efforts to consummate a sale the insurance
solicitor is indeed working "on his own behalf." Of course, by
so doing, he also benefits the company. But, as we have previously indicated, the services of an efficient independent
vontractor always bring benefits to the one who contracts for
such services. It should not be overlooked that the very freedom
whieh insurance solicitors enjoy is one of the strong motivating
influences which cause men to enter upon the career of selling
insurance. They are willing to take the risks and uncertainties
incident to such career in return for the opportunity of enjoying
an "independent calling."
Up to this point there has been no reference to the tests of
employment imposed by Clause B of the unemployment insurance acts. It is not necessary to devote any considerable space
to such test. Although both newsboys and insurance solicitors
may, on frequent or less frequent occasion, confer at the office
of the company and engage in such incidental activity as picking up promotional literature, rate books, or making telephone
' (1941) 29 Ky. L. J. 181.
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calls, any construction of language which is not unreal will

disclose them as essentially performing service. outside the
place of business of their employers.
It will now be appropriate to recapitulate by way of conclusion. It has been submitted that to date legislatures have
manifested no intent to impose absolute responsibility under
workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance acts on
all those who contract to receive service from others. Since
such is the case, "spread the risk" and "economic dependency" theories are inadequate in working out the limits of
coverage under social legislation. A sounder, more realistic
test can be based under "power of control" reasoning.
In applying such test, however, it is imperative to avoid
the mistake which many courts have made by their failure in
not working out a rationale to support the "control" theory.
A logical rationale will mark the limits of responsibility under
workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance acts
by use of reasoning which will demonstrate that enough economic benefit accrues from the "power of control" to justify
the acceptance of responsibility under social legislation. The
oft expressed fear that control can be artificially removed can
be overcome by caution in following legislative intent to discover if the one who performs services is following an "independent calling." If he is, then he is not meant to be covered
under present workmen's compensation and unemployment
insurance statutes.
Application of the suggested test upholds the conclusion
of the majority of courts in finding that newsboys and insurance solicitors are not meant to be covered by workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance statutes.
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